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I. INFORMATION SHARING IN UTAH 
At all levels of government, strategies to prevent terrorism will rely on the 
development and distribution of actionable information.  It is essential that the United 
States strengthen its capacity to gather, share, analyze and disseminate information.  In 
the State of Utah, however, these efforts have been jeopardized by a failure to adequately 
understand the cultural impediments to building more effective information systems.   
Spending more money on “stuff” (hardware, communications systems, etc.) will not 
provide for better information sharing, unless cultural barriers to change are recognized 
and taken into account in State planning.   
Public safety officers in Utah are, in my experience, extremely dedicated and 
competent public servants.  Nevertheless, three cultural characteristics of the public 
safety community pose significant problems for efforts to improve the gathering and flow 
of homeland security-related information challenges for information initiatives in Utah.  
First, even when seemingly reasonable changes are made in the way that information is 
supposed to be gathered and distributed, the lack of trust between the people in that 
redesigned system will sabotage its actual effectiveness.  Second, people in the 
information system are often subject to “groupthink;” that is, they lose their ability for 
independent thought and judgment, and instead follow the herd in resisting efforts for 
change.  Third, officials are prone to parochialism.  They view problems from a narrow, 
local perspective, rather from the bigger picture of State and national requirements for 
homeland security.  
This thesis analyzes how cultural barriers have impeded recent efforts to involve 
local police and sheriffs departments in informational sharing initiative.   My findings are 
typified by the response offered by an elected Sheriff to efforts at involving his 
department in an informational sharing database:  “Stay out of my county and take the 
database with you.”1  Another sheriff noted that “I don’t trust the State or the FBI for that 
 
1 Sheriff Rick Hawkins of Uintah County, Utah.  Interviewed by R. Flowers.  Discussion on 
Investigations.  October, 2003.  
2                                                
matter.”2   These statements are representative of the attitudes, values and cultural biases 
that my research found to be common among Utah’s public safety leaders. 
The culture within these public safety agencies has become a part of the fabric of 
Utah; it has long been ignored, and even accepted.  By not acknowledging this negative 
environment, and not creating a strategy to deal with it, efforts to the necessary 
collaborative information system in Utah have been undermined.  There has been some 
slow improvement in that system, but the urgency and measurable progress necessary in 
this effort does not exist.  
 The top priority in Utah should be the building of a new culture where trust and 
collaboration exist among the organizations involved in homeland security.  This thesis 
argues that such collaboration does not exist today, and will not grow naturally on its 
own.  Further, states such as Utah need to develop and implement a strategic plan to build 
a culture of collaboration.   If we fail to do so, we may end up spending enormous 
amounts of money with little positive impact.  The 30 million dollars that has been spent 
in Utah thus far (with millions more coming) for purchasing technology, equipping first 
responders, and creating complex plans has not begun to address the historical cultural 
characteristics that will undermine the entire effectiveness of this effort.  
 
A. FROM NATIONAL STRATEGY TO EFFECTIVE STATE-LEVEL 
CHANGE 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines that strategy as an effort to 
mobilize and organize our nation to secure the United States homeland from terrorist 
attacks.  The report went on to state that, “This is an exceedingly complex mission that 
requires coordinated and focused effort from our entire society – the federal government, 
state and local governments, the private sector and the American people.”3  The key 
words here are coordinated and focused.  Both characteristics have been ignored in Utah 
thus far in the information management area. In Utah, the goal of those involved in 
homeland security is to protect the citizens and interests of the state, the region, and the 
 
2 Sheriff Lamont Smith of Kane County, Utah.  Discussion during Sheriffs’ meeting with R. Flowers.  
May, 2003. 
       3 Office of Homeland Security.  “National Strategy for Homeland Security.”  Washington, D.C., July 
2002 
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Nation from injury, loss, and disruption and damage resulting from terrorist or criminal 
acts.4   This is accomplished through the elimination or reduction of vulnerability to such 
acts, the effective management of risks associated with such acts, and the early detection 
and proper response to those who threaten such acts.  Achieving this goal will require the 
gathering and sharing of preventive information that can only be provided in an 
environment of trust and collaboration.  What has become clear is that structural and 
cultural changes will be required in Utah, especially in the informational sharing area.  To 
attempt to introduce new technologies for information gathering and sharing without a 
strategy to build support and trust will not be successful.   
This thesis examines the MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information 
Exchange) program in Utah as a case study to analyze how cultural bias against sharing 
information can impede efforts at needed change.  Despite the strong support of 
MATRIX by the Department of Homeland Security, and that fact that – at least in theory 
– the system’s information-sharing capabilities offered significant improvements, Utah 
rejected the program.  According to interviews I conducted with elected leaders (who 
wanted to remain unnamed) the program itself was not the key problem.  Rather, 
MARTRIX became politically unacceptable because of the lack of trust in Utah of the 
national government, and the way the MATRIX program was introduced and 
“marketed.”  Utah rejected a potentially effective tool because of a culture of distrust of 
government, because and no strategy was adopted to sell the program in a way that would 
overcome existing cultural biases.  This omission was a critical misjudgment by those 
responsible for implementing the program. 
 MATRIX exemplifies the broader challenge confronting information initiatives 
in Utah.   One cannot just hope that a conducive environment for sharing will evolve.  
Impediments to change must be identified and solutions found.  To accomplish both 
objectives, I will used interviews, meeting discussions, and a survey to Chiefs and 
Sheriffs in to understand the nature of the impediments we confront, and derive strategies 
to overcome them.   I will also examine case studies such as MATRIX where failed 
efforts offer lessons that can be learned for the future.  Based on the specific restraining 
 
4 Utah Homeland Security Vision.  Prepared by the Department of Public Safety, State of Utah.  2002. 
 
4forces or impediments to information flow I identify, and an analysis of the academic 
literature on the nature of cultural impediments to change, I offer recommendations on 
how Utah can best move forward in the information realm.  These recommendations 
identify specific actionable steps that States like Utah can take to build the culture of 
collaboration needed to facilitate information sharing. 
The literature in the field indicates that cultural change is only possible if strong 
leadership helps drive that process.   A key finding of my thesis is that in Utah, the lack 
of such leadership (until recently) has contributed to the lack of collaboration, urgency, 
and allocation of resources towards building the effective collaboration required for 
information sharing.  The Governor of Utah must drive this effort, which will also require 
committed and aggressive leadership at all levels of government. Those leaders will 
create the vision and develop the strategy appropriate for their level.  The driving factors 
for leadership will be the dollars, law, and mutual benefit.  The strategy will include 
identification of restraining and driving forces in homeland security concepts.  The 
strategy will also identify actions that either support or remove the restraining or driving 
forces.  Recommendations will also be made to create the necessary change environment 
required to address those powerful cultural characteristics thriving in Utah today.  A 
recommendation to build a curriculum for first line responders will be made.  Until 
recently, training and education did not exist in Utah for homeland security.  A new 
program to meet this need has been developed by the Department of Public Safety with 
Utah State University in Logan, Utah and will be required by the Utah Peace Officer’s 
Standards and Training during the in-service period of training for first responders.  Such 
training and education programs are critical for building the trust and collaborative 
culture needed to promote genuine information sharing.  
5II. CHALLENGES TO THE INFORMATION PROCESS 
Information sharing has become the lifeblood of homeland security.  Without 
information, prevention is impossible.  Vision, strategy and actions are all guided by 
actionable information.  Actionable information must be the guiding factor in 
vulnerability and risk assessments.  By not using accurate /actionable information to 
drive current planning, the spending of millions of dollars is inefficient at best and 
meaningless at worst.  The Utah strategy should be driven by meaningful risk analysis 
and vulnerability evaluations.  These two efforts are guided by information provided at 
all levels of government inside and outside Utah.  This information is not being gathered 
effectively, shared efficiently, and disseminated meaningfully.  The main obstacles have 
been identified as cultural rather than financial. 
In Utah several efforts have been made to enhance the information sharing 
process for many years prior to the September 11th event.  Those efforts have had mixed 
success.  A review of the informational environment prior to September 11th would 
indicate little commitment at any level, no real support in resources, and certainly no 
strategy to improve the ability to share information.  An evaluation of the post-September 
11 environment indicates little improvement other than the buying of equipment.  The 
purchasing of equipment has been fast and furious and based on opinion and want rather 
than specific risks and threats to the citizens in Utah.  There is little agreement on the 
threats or risks.  The significant disagreement between disciplines such as fire and police 
is evidence of this.  The information processes continue to be fractured and stovepiped 
between all levels.  Significant effort has been made to create the infrastructure and there 
has been much improvement between the federal and state levels. However, significant 
improvement is still needed at the local and county levels.  This informational 
infrastructure just does not exist in Utah to the extent needed.  There has been significant 
effort to improve, but these efforts have failed because the strategy did not include the 
cultural issues embedded in Utah, cultural issues that have a long history. 
Historically in Utah, the information sharing environment has been nonexistent. 
The need was simply not seen as necessary beyond routine investigations.  Utah created 
ULEIN (Utah Law Enforcement Information Network) many years ago and last year had 
6                                                
less than 100 inquiries.5  When asked why it was not used more often, Val Shupe, 
President of the Utah Chief’s Association stated, “We (the Chief’s) have our own systems 
and don’t need the state’s.”  When asked what that was, he replied, “the phone.”6  He 
further stated that the ULEIN system creators never asked anyone about the necessity of 
such a system or made the users part of the design or decision making process; thus, no 
buy-in and no sense of need.  Getting the buy-in of the customer does require an inclusive 
strategy.  The national goal and state goal are noble and are explained in this paper, but 
without the buy-in of the leaders, they are only noble words on paper with little action.  
Thus the strategy must be drafted with the thought of creating a sense of importance and 
urgency in order to create the buy-in of the leaders.  
In the Markle Report historical and cultural features are discussed.  The report 
concludes that historical and cultural features interact to shape the response or resistance 
to homeland security.  Further, these features, according to the report, may move 
organizations towards or away from an inter-operable, interconnected national homeland 
security effort.7  It is clear through meetings, interviews, and a survey that in Utah 
cultural features, both driving and restraining, exist.  The Markle report further reads that 
the historical and cultural environments have evolved and are shaped by adverse political, 
economic and social interactions that include a history of conflict, distrust, jealously, and 
even an environment where groups have formed a common cause.  This is evident in 
Utah and will be described in the context of groupthink. 
In October of 2002 the Oquirrh Institute held a review of the 2002 Olympic 
security effort.  Sixty participants from the private sector and from the local, state, and 
federal public safety community attended the conference.  They identified several 




5 ULEIN (Utah Law Enforcement Information Network) inquiries provided by Capt. Mitch McKee, 
Utah Criminal Information Center, Utah Department of Public Safety.  2003 
6 Chief Val Shupe of South Ogden Police Department.  President of Utah Chief’s Association.  
Interviewed by author.  2004 
7 Markle Foundation Task Force.  “Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security.  
Second Report.  New York City, NY.  December 2003.  Page 78 
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1.   Build social capital - the Mortar 
2. Rely on networks - not on a mainframe 
3. Integrate homeland security into all public safety activity 
4. Make haste - but with deliberation 
Without a strategy to develop the above-listed principles, the homeland security 
strategy is without focus.  The Oquirrh Institute study pointed out the importance of 
structure and relationships.  According to the study, social capital was of primary 
importance.  Social capital is a shorthand way of thinking about relationships.  Again, 
this illustrates the point that government at all levels can build structures and provide 
equipment, but relationships will hold things together.  These lessons are extremely 
important to the homeland security effort in Utah. 
I have identified three aspects of human behavior that will require thought and 
strategy development.  I found these three to be mentioned more often and demonstrated 
in behaviors throughout the state of Utah.  These three particularly strong characteristics 
embedded in the cultures in Utah are parochialism, groupthink, and the lack of trust.  
They have generally been identified as restraining forces to the Homeland Security effort.  
As these characteristics are evaluated, a strategy at all levels of government must be 
developed.  Restraining and driving forces beyond these three have also been identified 
through interviews, group discussion, experiences, and a survey of Utah law enforcement 
leadership, but the three most powerful are lack of trust, groupthink and parochialism.  
We begin with a discussion on what the culture is in Utah and how culture shapes 
the local, state and national effort concerning homeland security in Utah.  According to 
author Edgar Schein, “Culture, is a pattern of shared assumptions that a group has 
learned, a way to think, perceive, feel and eventually act.”8  As an example, Utah has a 
long history of antigovernment sentiment.  Utah was founded by a group of people who 
were persecuted by government.  This fact is repeated often and contributes to the lack of 
trust in government.  Rural Utah has a strong history of individuality and self-reliance: 
“The western mentality” is a phrase often used in Utah. This western mentality usually 
describes individuals or groups that are strongly independent, want to be left alone, and 
need little governance.  The rural geography of Utah has made it necessary that  
8 Schein, Edgar H.  “Organizational Culture and Leadership.”  Second Edition.  Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, San Francisco, California, 1997.  Page 12 
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governmental agencies build “stand alone” systems through local agencies and not rely 
on state or federal assistance.  These shared assumptions and a long history of 
independence have evolved into a “we can do it ourselves” attitude.  This independence 
has developed into system protectionism and jealous ownership.  Any suggested change 
recommended by other government agencies is taken personally.  An example of these 
characteristics is provided in investigations by the state, initiated investigations that lead 
into a rural county in Utah.  The Utah State Division of Driver’s License was 
investigating fraud inside the Driver’s License office.  The investigation led to a suspect 
in a rural county in Utah where an arrest was made at 7:30 a.m. on December 5, 2003. 9  
State officers went to the residence and made the arrest.  The Sheriff’s Office was 
notified at 7:15 a.m. of the impending arrests, fifteen minutes prior to the arrest.  The 
Sheriff was extremely angry and called the Commissioner of Public Safety threatening 
him and his officers with arrest if “they came into his county again without prior 
approval”.10  Later, at a strategy meeting, this event was discussed, and it was concluded 
that the Sheriff was justified in his concern, (however, it was also stated that his anger 
was unacceptable).11   During that meeting, a strategy was suggested to avoid this type of 
incident in the future.  Much can be learned from this seemingly unimportant rural Utah 
event. As childish as this may sound, this event is an effective example of the 
environment in rural Utah and further evidence of the need for strategies to be developed 
to deal with the cultures of distrust between agencies.  As another rural Sheriff said, 
“This stuff wasn’t built overnight and it will not go away with just words and good 
intentions.”12  This is an effective example of embedded culture, which will take time to 
change.  But that time must bring positive experiences and collaboration, or nothing will 
change.  
Lessons must also be learned from another state investigation involving a small 
rural county, .  The Utah Department of Public Safety often sends investigators to check 
compliance of the alcohol laws by commercial entities such as bars, clubs, and 
 
9 Driver License Arrest.  DPS Case #2003-00035.  Vernal, Utah.  December 5, 2003. 
10 Sheriff Rick Hawkins of Uintah County Sheriff’s Office.  Phone Call to the Commissioner of Public 
Safety.  2004 
11 Meeting at Utah Department of Public Safety Headquarters over Driver License issues.  2004 
12 Sheriff Edgar Phillips of Millard County, Utah.  Interview by author.  February, 2004 
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restaurants.  The investigators were detailed to a rural county and, after a time, several 
summons were issued to a number of local businesses.  The reaction to this enforcement 
by the elected sheriff was quick.   
The Sheriff received several complaints from local businesses, including a County 
Commissioner.  The Commissioner was evidently very vocal with the Sheriff about the 
state coming into town without some warning (an example of western mentality).  The 
state investigators did not advise the elected Sheriff they were coming into the 
community of 15,000.  This oversight left the Sheriff with the sense that he was not 
trusted or considered important enough to be involved.13   The Sheriff asked the 
Commissioner of Public Safety if the reason he was not told was a matter of trust It 
wasn’t; it was simply an oversight.  This simple oversight had dramatic effects on the 
relationship between local law enforcement and the state.  The negative feelings continue 
to this day. This case is four years old and still reverberates in this small community and 
is talked about among a small powerful group in this area.  Incidents of this nature are not 
uncommon and evolve into restraining forces to building an effective homeland security 
environment.  Actions of this nature only serve to enforce the negative restraining forces 
of distrust, parochialism, and groupthink.  This is an example of historical environments 
evolving and being shaped by adverse interactions.  In this county there is a history of 
conflict, distrust, and jealousy, as the Markle Report described.  
The biggest obstacle to implementing the best-designed system in the world is 
often culture, and unless fundamental changes occur in the culture, progress is stymied.  
Culture in Utah must undergo a fundamental change.  The Markle Report emphasized 
that no vehicle will lead to change unless the leader at the top is completely clear about 
the objects he or she seeks.  Leadership is key.  In order to have an effective homeland 
security environment in Utah, the major challenges may not be creating physical 
infrastructures, but the cultural barriers and leadership challenges.  Parochialism has been 
identified as one of those cultural restraining barriers that must be strategized.  
Parochialism in leadership is alive and thriving in Utah.  
 
13 Sheriff Lamar Guymon of Emery County Sheriff’ Office.  Confidential discussion with the 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.  2004 
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Stephen Robbins discusses in his book Essentials of Organizational Behavior 
cultural barriers that effect change.  One of the major challenges is parochialism.14    An 
example of parochialism in Utah is information sharing among geographically adjoining 
agencies.  Historically, Utah agencies (especially public safety agencies) do not routinely 
share information.  Rather, they protect their information.  The current environment in 
Utah is evidence of this historical stovepiped approach developed from parochial 
approaches caused by the independence. This stovepiped information was generally 
limited and protected by the originating organization for confidentiality reasons.  
Information generally concerned criminal investigations within the jurisdictions without 
any thought to gathering, sharing, and analysis of information to share on a national level.  
The leaders in these organizations believed they had the best systems and were not 
interested in changing them.  Reasons ranged from cost to no sense of need to even 
apathy.  The new environment now required brings new sharing challenges.  The 
challenge has been made more difficult with the stovepiped systems that have been 
created by independent organizations.  No planning included sharing.  An example exists 
in Washington County, Utah. 
The St. George Police Department, which is located in Washington County, 
created an informational management system that only focused on the needs of the city.  
Washington County Sheriff’s Department did the same.  The result was a geographic area 
with shared law enforcement challenges but without informational systems that could 
routinely share information.  This is an example of parochialism, as Robbins described.15  
Any information sharing had to be done with meetings, specific database searches, or old 
fashion phone calls.  This environment evolved over time and is an example of the 
information infrastructure in Utah.  Those reasons ranged from shortsightedness to 
system protection to lack of trust to simply not understanding the future needs of sharing.  
The most significant impacting characteristic of this environment was the lack of 
leadership, trust, and planning.  The leaders developed their system based on historical 
parochialism and with no thought of needing to share with other agencies.  
 
14 Robbins, Stephen P., “Essentials of Organizational Behavior.”  Third Edition.  Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  1992.  Page 13 
15 Robbins, Stephen P., “Essentials of Organizational Behavior.”  Third Edition.  Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  1992.  Page 13 
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Parochialism is not unique to government agencies.  In discussing the challenges 
of business managers in a global economy, Robbins writes, “A global economy presents 
challenges to managers that they never had to confront when their operations were 
constrained within national borders.”16  According to Robbins, business leaders view the 
world solely through their own eyes and perspective.  People with a parochial perspective 
do not recognize that other people have different ways of living and working.  Those in 
Washington County acted much like business leaders dealing with a global economy.  
Further, Robbins indicates that to add insult to injury, Americans also frequently believe 
their cultural values and customs are superior to others.  This characteristic is alive and 
well in public safety organizations in Utah. Different communication systems and record 
keeping systems are once again indicators of parochial decisionmaking.  This problem is 
compounded with unwillingness to even entertain that a different approach may be more 
effective.  An example of this is the UCAN (Utah Communications Agency Network) 
Project in Utah.  The Sheriff of Salt Lake County continually refused to join a 
communication network with shared resources simply because he wants his own system.  
This is even after MOUs (Memorandums of Understanding) were signed and an 
expansion to the Center was made at the cost of several hundred thousand dollars.  His 
statement was, “No one is going to tell me how to run my communication center.  
Further, we have a better system and we are going to keep it.” 17  Salt Lake County 
Commissioners had to finally get involved and compelled the Sheriff to finally join the 
UCAN Project.  
 A governmental agency can spend hundreds of millions of dollars on an 
informational infrastructure to gather, share, or analyze information, but without the buy-
in of those who will provide that necessary support, the results can be an inefficient, 
ineffective, and insignificant infrastructure.  Howard Aldrich in his book Organizations 
Evolving describes the importance of leadership in this process, He writes, “We 
emphasize, however, that no vehicle will lead to change unless the leader at the top is 
 
16 Robbins, Stephen P., “Essentials of Organizational Behavior.”  Third Edition.  Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  1992.  Page 13 
       17Sheriff Aaron Kennard of Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office stated this in a LEED’s (Law 
Enforcement Executive Directors) meeting at the Sandy Police Department.  2003 
12
                                                
completely clear about the objects he or she seeks.”18  If leadership is so critical, then 
parochial leadership could be fatal to these efforts.  An examination of the challenge 
demonstrated the importance of individual public safety leaders’ beliefs concerning 
providing information and supporting other governmental agencies.  He writes that it is 
the elite of an organization who make the decisions leading to organizational change.19  
On the flip side, Utah history is characterized by the elite resisting organizational change.  
A cursory examination of Utah reveals the importance of a critical analysis of the 
behaviors of parochial leaders and their influence on organizational behaviors affecting 
the informational processes.  Parochial leaders can have dramatic effects on groups under 
other leaders also.  This influence can lead to groupthink, which generally has developed 
into resistance to anything led by the state, other than the giving out of dollars. 
Groupthink is just as the name indicates, a group of people who have joined 
together for whatever reason.  They develop a common goal, common thoughts, or 
common actions.  Groupthink is alive and well in all parts of Utah.  Groupthink has 
generally been a restraining force in building a collaborative informational/homeland 
security environment.  Dr. Jim Breckenridge of Stanford University spoke on the subject 
of groupthink at the Naval Postgraduate School in a class on fear management.  He stated 
that groupthink is a real threat to people fighting terrorism.  Some characteristics of 
groupthink, according to Dr. Breckenridge, include: 
1. A big press for consensus 
2. People getting comfortable in groups and becoming easy to lead 
3. Small elite groups causing real damage to the overall strategy of the group 
4. Shutting oneself off from alternative thoughts and idea 
5. Normal groups often make bad mistakes by being influenced by groupthink 
In Utah numerous groups exist who demonstrate these characteristics in such a 
fashion that could prove to be critical restraining forces in homeland security.  Influential 
members of the Utah Sheriffs’ Association demonstrate the characteristics of small elite 
groups, causing real damage to homeland security efforts in Utah.  These few influential 
members often take a combative stance against the state, even when the actions taken are 
 
18 Aldrich, Howard E.  “Organizations Evolving.”   Sage Publications, London, 2000.   
19 Aldrich, Howard E.  “Organizations Evolving.”   Sage Publications, London, 2000.  
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to their mutual benefit.  These individuals press for consensus when it is not in the best 
interest of the association.  As a result of this, there has been strong division in the 
Sheriff’s Association organization.  This is evident by many of their own members 
speaking to the Commissioner of Public Safety after meetings and expressing their 
positions of support.  They simply do not want to voice their opinions publicly or in the 
group for fear of criticism from the group. 
According to an article in Psychology Today, groupthink symptoms are displayed 
in many ways.20  Powerful social pressures brought to bear by the members of a cohesive 
group whenever a dissident voices his objection to a group consensus.  Examples of this 
in Utah are as recent as a few months ago and involve issues such as a state sponsored 
dive/rescue team, creation of an investigative unit, and the use of special enforcement 
teams.  The need for a dive team was identified by those forming homeland security at 
the state level as appropriate for such activities as security checks of waterways and 
dams.  The team was formed and trained.  Dissension was immediate among state sheriffs 
concerned that the state was impeding upon their mission and may be competing for their 
resources.  A decision was made by a group of sheriffs not to call the state team for any 
support, hoping the state would be forced to abandon this effort for lack of a mission.  
One sheriff who contacted the team for help in finding a drowning victim voiced his 
support of the team in an open meeting and was immediately attacked by the other 
sheriffs in the room for not supporting their position.  The issue then became so divisive 
and concurrence-seeking became so dominant that it overrode a realistic appraisal of the 
team, which in the end was determined to be a positive thing for the sheriff’s 
departments.  This type of behavior became so common in the Sheriffs’ Association 
meeting that the Commissioner of Public Safety started attending the meetings to defend 
the state’s position on certain issues.  Another key characteristic of groupthink evident in 
the example above is the norm of remaining loyal to the group by sticking with the 
policies to which the group has already committed itself, even when those policies are 
obviously working out badly and have unintended consequences that disturb the 
conscience of each member.21  The Commissioner received several phone calls from 
 
20 Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum 
21 Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum 
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other sheriffs who were disturbed by the meetings and did not support the group’s 
position.  They just felt that to speak up would only bring further dissension to the group.  
As one sheriff put it, “I will do what I need to do regardless of the group’s decision.  I 
will not have a family standing on the shore waiting for us to find their loved one’s body 
when I am out of divers, knowing full well that a team is available.”22
According to Dr. Breckenridge, the one important strategy to combating this type 
of groupthink is putting in place strong leadership.  The breakdown of groupthink has to 
start at the top.  It must be part of the Department of Public Safety’s strategy to be more 
aggressive in working with the leadership of the Utah Chiefs’ and Sheriffs’ Associations 
in combating these small elite groups.  Historically, there has not been substantial effort 
in this area.  Recently the Commissioner of Public Safety has spent much time 
communicating with the leaders of these groups, and the results of these efforts have been 
positive.  The environment now is more collaborative, communication is more effective, 
and trust seems to be evolving.  As Dr. Breckenridge said, “This type of influence is a 
real danger to people fighting terrorism in Utah.”23
Examples of groupthink have the five symptoms that are important to identify 
when looking to build a strategy.  Those five symptoms are invulnerability, rationale, 
morality, stereotyping and applying pressure.24  Examples of these in Utah are well 
documented.  The illusion of invulnerability provides some degree of over optimism such 
as the taking down of federal road signs on federal property by county officials, including 
the sheriff.  The rural environment does give a sense of invulnerability when the state or 
federal officials rarely appear at meetings or only discuss issues through letters.  The 
associations often take the position that their group position is always right and they 
become overly optimistic in their efforts.  The dive team for the state of Utah is just 
another example where local law enforcement took the position not to support the team, 
claiming that the various counties support each other.  This makes a great sound bite, but 
in fact could not happen.  The qualified people just do not exist among the agencies. 
 
22 Sheriff Dale Stacey of Rich County Sheriffs Office.  Discussion with  the Commissioner of Public 
Safety.  2003 
23 Breckenridge, Dr. Jim  Professor at Stanford University.  NPS Class  March 15, 2004 
24 Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum 
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Rationale, is when a group attempts to justify a position, even though it goes 
against reasonable judgment.  An example is the position of the Sheriffs’ Association not 
to support the use of the state dive teams, investigative teams, or equipment, all the time 
knowing that they could not support each other even if they wanted to.  Another example 
of rationale, is the use of state investigators by non state organizations.  The Sheriff of 
Daggett County stated, “It would be a cold day in hell before I would ask you state 
investigators for anything in my county.”25  It is axiomatic that his investigators are not 
trained, and in many cases not qualified to handle complex criminal investigations in 
areas ranging from blood splatter to internet crime.   
Morality in the context of groupthink is the attitude that we have a certain mission 
and the state should not interfere.  It has been repeated by the President of the Sheriffs’ 
Association that the state is trying to take over and the sheriffs need to band together to 
keep from losing their mission.26   There have been many discussions among the Sheriffs’ 
Associations about their fear of the state developing a state police force.  When the 
president of the Sheriffs’ Association was asked about this, his response was, “If the state 
takes over, sheriff departments will be regulated to serving papers (subpoenas) only.”27   
This position and belief is common among the elected sheriffs in the state of Utah.  There 
has been no discussion at the state level to take over services common to sheriff 
departments. 
The holding of stereotyped views is common.  This is evident in the terms often 
used by different groups, such as “local yokels, the feds, the state,” each term used to 
separate one group from another, usually in a negative light.  The stereotyped ideas of 
each level of government in regards to other levels have evolved over time.  The term 
“local yokels” is offensive to most.  As far away as Kentucky, when a group of local 
officials were asked about the term local yokels, they replied that the term connotes 
 
25 Sheriff Allen Campbell of Daggett County Sheriffs Office.  Discussion with the Commissioner of  
the Utah Department of Public Safety.  2003 
26 Sheriff Kirk Smith of  Washington County Sheriffs Office.  Confidential Discussion by telephone 
with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.  2003 
27 Sheriff Brad Slater of  Weber County Sheriffs Office.  Comments made to the Commissioner of the 
Utah Department of Public Safety.  2003 
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unsophisticated, untrustworthy, simple, and unimportant.  Some of their own commented 
that when used by federal officials these terms are offensive.28
The applying of peer pressure to any individual who expresses doubts about any 
of the group’s shared illusions is common.  An example again is the dive team, where one 
sheriff spoke up against the group’s decision and received a brow beating.  Recently, 
during a law enforcement leadership meeting in St. George, Utah, the issue of asking for 
state support was brought up.  One chief spoke up on behalf of the state, and several other 
chiefs spoke out against the position and pressured the supportive chief to sit down.  
Incidents of this type are not uncommon in the areas of information sharing, combining 
investigations, or requesting state resources.29  
Groupthink stretches into all levels and disciplines in Utah.  An example is when 
a group has political biases, such as in Kane County, Utah.  Ongoing controversial issues, 
unrelated to homeland security, such as “road issues” and who owns roads on Federal 
land, causes the arguments to spill over into other areas.  Different management styles 
develop that take on such human characteristics as a narcissistic personality.  These 
leaders are vulnerable to biased information processing so they overestimate their own 
strength.  They have paranoid personalities and feel surrounded by the enemies (state and 
federal).  Thus, their world is dominated by suspicion and distrust.  They are suspicious 
of the motives of others, believing they are going to be exploited, harmed or deceived.  
The individual personalities can develop into communities of belief.  Communities of 
belief are scattered groups that share common values and philosophies regarding a social 
problem.  
Some local leaders have spoken of being humiliated and, thus, angry.  This 
history has had dramatic effects among the public safety organizations in Utah.  However 
deep rooted and unspoken the resentment is, the negative factors must be acknowledged 
at each level.  Strategies must be developed to address them or coming together 
(interoperability) will not occur.  The experiences mentioned have created an 
environment in Utah of humiliation, resentment, anger, and ambivalence.  These 
 
28 Homeland Security In Rural America Matters Conference.  Breakout Session.  Somerset, Kentucky.  
March 8, 2004. 
29 EDI, Executive Development Institute Conference.  St. George, Utah.  Meeting held Friday, March 
26, 2004 
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powerful human emotions, when shared across enough organizations, create a 
“community of belief.”.  This community of belief is extremely powerful when it controls 
resources and political environments.   
Trust is the one factor that is mentioned most often as non-existent.  As Sheriff 
Phillips pointed out, “No trust is the culture in Utah.”30   There is little discussion on what 
trust is and how to build trust into a strategy.  What has become clear is that not having 
dialogue on this critical characteristic is to build failure into the homeland security effort. 
Trust must be defined, understood, and engrained in all education, policy, and 
leadership decisions.  Stephen Robbins discusses the critical issue of trust in leadership.  
Robbins defines trust as a positive expectation of words, actions, or decisions.  He further 
discusses trust as a highly dependent process based on relevant experiences. 
Unfortunately, in Utah, for the most part, the relevant experiences have been negative (if 
the feedback from the rural law-enforcement leaders is believed.) 
Robbins further points out that trust takes time to form, builds incrementally, and 
accumulates.  Most of us find it difficult to trust immediately.  This simple fact is critical 
when one takes into account the swiftness with which homeland security is developing.  
Sheriff Ed Phillips of Millard County, Utah said, “Trust will be key and will take time.”31  
This critical characteristic, Phillips so aptly points out, will take time.  In Utah, the lack 
of trust has been created over time, and people have long memories.  A Sheriff had a 
negative experience with the state SWAT team responding in his county on a drug case.  
Upon completion, the SWAT team left the equipment dirty and while in town their 
behavior was less than professional.  When he contacted DPS leadership no one seemed 
to care, according to the Sheriff.  The interesting fact about this incident is it happened 
five years ago and he is still repeating it.  This is an indication of the power of bad 
experiences and how these negative feelings will affect the future if a dialogue is not 
open, honest, and solution oriented.  To build trust we will need to disclose, give access 
and share.  Opening systems and sharing databases or resources make organizations 
vulnerable to criticism and information leaks.  An FBI agent reported the reason for the 
FBI’s historical nonsharing culture is that the FBI has been “burned so many times by 
 
30 Sheriff Edgar Phillips,  Millard County Sheriffs Office.  As stated in the Utah Department of Public 
Safety Survey.  March, 2004. 
31 Sheriff Edgar Phillips, Millard County Sheriffs Office.  E-mail to Robert Flowers.  February, 2004 
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sharing information, and no one is willing to put their career on the line to simply share 
information and take the risk of being burned.”32  Robbins also points out that trust may 
not necessarily mean taking the risk; rather it is a willingness to take the risk.33  
Organizations have not been willing to take the risks for many valid reasons, mainly fear 
of being “burned.” 
Recent evidence, according to Robbins, breaks down trust in the following 
manner:34  
1. Integrity – being honest and truthful and discussing things 
2. Competence – technical and interpersonal knowledge and developed skills  
3. Consistency – reliability, predictability and good judgment 
4. Loyalty – willingness to protect agreements 
Using Robbins description of trust, Utah history is replete with examples where 
integrity, consistency, competence, and loyalty have been violated, ignored, or 
disregarded in the interactions of individuals and organizations.  The cultural result of 
this history is the current environment characterized by a lack of respect and trust and 
unwillingness to work together in the critical information area of homeland security.  
When one breaks down trust in this fashion, a strategy can be developed to build trust 
among organizations.  An example of positive intentions without communication, 
education and collaboration is the creation of the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center, 
UCIC. 
To build trust in information sharing, the Utah Department of Public Safety 
created the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC).  The goal was to build trust and to 
break down the “stovepiping” that exists at the municipal, county, and state levels.  The 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and UCIC were created to cross jurisdictions for 
information sharing in regards to terrorism. The intentions of those creating these 
infrastructures were positive, but no consideration was given to the negative cultural 
environment and no strategy was made to gain the support of leadership throughout  
32 FBI Agent Rick Palmer.  Interviewed by Robert Flowers.  January, 2004 
33 Robbins, Stephen P., “Organizational Behavior.”  Tenth Edition.  Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003.  
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public safety organizations in Utah.  As a result, public safety agencies have been slow to 
support their infrastructures. 
The problem is directly related to the fact that little collaboration, education or 
communication among the agencies was utilized.  The result has been little collaboration, 
limited positive experiences, and no trust built.  Another similar example is the failure of 
the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) program previously 
mentioned.  
The program is supported through the Department of Homeland Security, but the 
misunderstanding of systems has created a political environment of mistrust rather than 
the “trusted, decentralized network” the Markle Report indicates is necessary in this new 
homeland security environment.  The controversy was created when the Utah Legislature 
learned of the MATRIX project through a fiscal note attached to the project.  The 
negative reaction by elected officials to this program is an indication of the necessity to 
ensure collaboration to build trust.  The reaction of the Utah Legislature was to basically 
shut down the project.  This reaction is an indication of the volatility of the public interest 
issue and the critical importance of collaboration and education required to create an 
information network environment in Utah.  This is also an example of not involving the 
major stakeholders in a collaborative fashion to build trust into the public issue and the 
results. 
 The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program is an example of the MATRIX 
problem that developed in Utah at a federal level.  TIA was developed to manage 
information and to enhance the government’s ability to detect terrorist activity.  The 
confusion and ambiguousness concerning TIA created such controversy that Congress 
eliminated all funding for the TIA program and “any successor program.”  The Report 
makes an interesting point when it reads, “Had the government, in developing a TIA, 
formulated policy principles and guidelines on the search and use of technologies to 
access privately held data and engaged in a public discussion of those policies, it would 
not have become so mired in the controversy that resulted in the banning of research by 
Congress.  This is another example of little or no communication, education or 
collaboration at the federal level.”35  In Utah the impression or MATRIX was that it was 
 
35 Markle Foundation Task Force.  “Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security.  
Second Report.  New York City, NY.  December 2003.   
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somehow a secret agreement by the Governor of Utah and others.  It played out as a 
sinister operation.  During a legislative hearing, Utah State Senator Patrice Arent 
commented that just the name MATRIX conjured up a negative impression.36  In March, 
2004 Governor Walker finally gave instructions to the Commissioner of Public Safety to 
stop Utah’s participation in the MATRIX program.  The TIA at the federal level and the 
MATRIX program at the state level are effective examples of cultural issues.  These are 
further examples of the need to develop, inform, educate and collaborate in order to gain 
widespread support and trust for programs such as these. 
The interesting point of this information sharing program was that the information 
was already available to law enforcement, the technology just made the information 
available faster.  The three listed suggestions previously discussed in this paper were all 
aspects inquired into by the press, the Utah Legislature, and the public. 
 
36 Arent, Senator Patrice.  Legislative Appropriation Committee Hearing.  Utah State Capitol.  
February 12, 2004. 
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III. OVERCOMING CULTURAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
Change does not just happen.  You can wish for it and hope for it, but to be 
successful you must plan for it.  Change is brought about by the actions of people, and 
requires thought and strategy.  According to Dr. Bonger of Stanford University, “work on 
the worst first” then “prioritize the attack, as one strategizes change.”37  To create a sense 
of urgency we must make it clear that “we all go down together” if success is not a result.  
This is the urgency part that has been discussed earlier.  To begin the strategy, an 
acknowledgement of a process is important.  Change will take time, depending on many 
factors.  Those factors include how powerful people's beliefs are, how controversial one’s 
own concepts are, and how effective the strategy is.  You can’t ignore that change is 
brought about by people.  The strategy must begin and end with an understanding of 
basic human behavior.  To ignore the people part of the equation dooms any necessary 
change to failure.  People involved must go through a change process that is planned and 
well thought out.  The change must also be introduced properly.  There are many forces 
that work for or against change.  A process to identify, study, and allow for these forces is 
a must. 
A basic understanding of the culture of those affected by the change must be 
acknowledged. Cultural issues in Utah, such as parochialism, groupthink and trust, must 
be strategized for desired results.  That strategy must include robust communication, 
meaningful collaboration, and effective education and training programs, all critical to 
developing strong human relationships.  These changes will be enacted by people and 
will not just occur naturally.  Author Ronald Sims writes, “It’s important to think through 
people-related changes as fully as you would think through a change in technology or 
another area.”38  Millions of dollars have been spent on technology and processes in 
Utah, but it is hard to find effort or resources dedicated to thinking through the people-
related change requirements.  The people part of this was never anticipated at the state 
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level.  This was a critical mistake.  According to Sims, far too frequently, managers and 
their organizations fail to set aside the time necessary for analyzing changing conditions 
and attitudes and suddenly find themselves in the middle of severe complications.  
Managers must learn to anticipate the need for change.39   
In the Division of Emergency Services/Homeland Security for the State of Utah 
many meetings were held to discuss the spending of dollars, creation of regions, and the 
putting together of the state emergency plan.  The challenges involving people and 
organizations were never discussed.  The results have been resistance at best and 
undermining at worst among the involved agencies.  According to Sims, whenever 
possible, the need to change with the times should be anticipated, and management 
should attempt to implement these changes before the crisis-state is reached.  Otherwise, 
serious organizational behavior difficulties can result.  This would also bear out the point 
that a strategy must be developed that takes into account the people part before a crisis.  
This is not occurring in Utah.  
Most people hate any change that doesn’t include concomitant financial rewards.  
This is certainly true of homeland security.  The change in philosophy has been resisted 
at all levels and jurisdictions in Utah.  Any change that has been discussed without 
federal dollars attached has been met with resistance in Utah.  Sims points out the 
criticality of people; no matter how technically or administratively perfect a proposed 
change may be, people make or break it.  “Our people resist change for many reasons.  
Resisting change does not necessarily mean that they will never accept it.  Change may 
be resisted because it was introduced improperly.”40  Even the introduction of a new 
concept (especially as controversial as information sharing is) must be strategized for.  
The Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC) could be an example of a needed change 
that improper introduction made less effective.  The center was created with no thought 
of or input from the customers and thus had little buy-in.  However, as time has passed 
and people in public safety organizations have become familiar with UCIC, it has become 
more useful.  This simple fact can be used as an example of an important process that can 
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be doomed to failure when not introduced effectively.  The MATRIX program again can 
be used as an example of failure to contemplate the reaction by the organizations and 
people involved. 
Understanding and managing organizational changes presents complex challenges 
with strong common feelings.  Often the speed and complexity of change severely tests 
the capabilities of managers and employees to adapt rapidly, even in positive 
environments.  However, when organizations fail to change, the costs of that failure may 
be quite high.  Managers and employees must understand the nature of the change needed 
and the likely effects of alternative approaches to bring about that change.  It is clear that 
a change in individual thought must happen in a post-911 environment.  The speed in 
which that change must occur will bring with it substantial challenges.  It is clear that in 
Utah these changes are not occurring quickly enough.  To emphasize what Ronald Sims 
wrote, “The costs of failure may be quite high.”41   In terrorism, it could be the highest 
price of all, loss of life.  The urgency of a needed change environment and a strategy 
cannot be over emphasized. 
The first challenge is creating an environment with a sense of urgency to motivate 
the necessary changes.  Efforts in this area have had minimal success in coordination and 
sharing of information due to the current environment of let’s wait and see.  Success has 
been driven by federal grant dollars.  Currently, in Utah, there is no sense of urgency to 
motivate a change from the current critical environment.  John P. Kotter suggests in his 
article “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” “Not creating a sense of 
urgency is one of the major reasons change fails.”  Without motivation, people won’t 
help and the effort goes nowhere.  Kotter further writes, “By not establishing a great 
enough urgency a transformational environment will not occur.”42  The chief executive 
officer will be key to creating the sense of urgency.  A former CEO of a large European 
company stated that a great motivation for change is to create the belief that the status 
quo is more dangerous than looking into the unknown.  This is certainly true when 
dealing with terrorism.  The status quo of information gathering, sharing, and 
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disseminating in Utah could be extremely dangerous.  Understanding the motivation to 
change is critical to building a strategy that outlines concepts, procedures or tools to be 
used in this effort.  Kurt Lewin’s model suggests that every change requires individuals 
to go through the following steps:43   
1. Unfreezing 
2. Changing or moving 
3. Refreezing 
Lewin discusses his concept of “unfreezing.”   At this beginning stage individuals 
recognize the need for change driven by the sense of urgency.  The individual must see 
the status quo as less than ideal.  The unfreezing in Utah would be changing the minds of 
those resistant to the homeland security collaboration of federal, state, and local 
government agencies.  It is the changing of the attitudes of leadership. It does not matter 
which level one is discussing, the unfreezing of the thought process is appropriate from 
the highest level of decision making to the first responder.  How to “unfreeze” the 
contemporary thought would be part of the education and training strategies developed.  
This unfreezing will require time, positive experiences, and a basic understanding of the 
importance of a collaborative environment. What is important is an understanding that 
the statues quo may be less than ideal and maybe even deadly in the homeland security 
environment.   
Once individuals recognize the need for change and have received the necessary 
training, they begin altering their behavior.  This behavior results in a changing or 
moving environment.  Once change begins, it must be continually monitored and 
reinforced by leadership.  Further, once people change or move in, a strategy should be 
developed to maintain the desired behavior. 
Refreezing is the final step in Lewin’s three-step process.  The new behavior 
becomes a part of the individual’s moral behavior.  Refreezing is simply a new way of 
thinking.  This refreezing of the thought process will require training, education, and 
robust leadership.  Refreezing is simply institutionalizing new approaches.   
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Lewin’s model indicates that for change efforts to be successful, the three-stage 
process must be completed.  Successful change thus requires that old behaviors be 
discarded, new behaviors be introduced, and these new behaviors be institutionalized and 
rewarded.  In Utah, those implementing change thus far at the state level have not 
understood that to institute change an understanding of the change process will be 
critical.  Creation of strategies in the context of this lack of understanding of human 
behavior actually has had a negative impact on creating a collaborative homeland security 
environment.  The new culture required did not evolve.  Actually, the actions of those 
involved reinforced the historical negative cultural environment thriving in Utah.  The 
new directions needed were simply ignored, or actually undermined by many of those 
involved in homeland security.  It was easier to maintain and spend the dollars on “items” 
rather than think about what really needed to be addressed in the culture. 
What has become clear is that traditional and historical cultural behaviors, both 
negative and positive, are evident in Utah, and a strategy is required to deal with cultural 
issues or the current efforts will not be effective.  Stages of change must be 
acknowledged and a strategy built around that concept.  Each level of government will go 
through the three stages regardless of what they are labeled or which expert’s model is 
used.  Each level will take time to change and time is the enemy of security in today’s 
environment. 
“Fully implementing the needed change for an interoperable homeland security 
direction will ultimately require the development of a strategy that encourages unified 
operations.”44  Unified operations in general do not exist in Utah.  To contemplate a 
unified operation in the area of information sharing will require a strategy to change the 
current environment of distrust, parochialism, and groupthink so common in Utah.  This 
strategy should include the concepts, procedures needed, and resources required to assist 
leaders.  The strategy will require the creation of enforceable policy, developing of 
leadership, and effective training of first line responders. Understanding this enormous 
challenge of changing organizations wrapped in history and tradition will be critical.  
This is the “people part” that is being ignored.  When taking the challenges as a whole, 
the processes of change may seem impossible given the resistance.  However, if the 
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strategy is broken down into different levels, focusing on particular problems or 
challenges then helps create the changes required. 
Change of this magnitude, at any level of government, will bring with it driving 
and restraining forces, as described in the force field analysis created by Kurt Lewin.  
According to Lewin, this model asserts that a person’s behavior is the product of two 
opposing forces:  one force pushes toward preserving the status quo, and another force 
pushes for change.  When the two opposing forces are approximately equal, current 
behavior is maintained.  For change to occur, one must increase forces for change, 
weaken the forces for status quo, or a combination of these actions.  This is true both for 
the individual and the group.45  This method is concise and brings focus to the problems.  
It is also flexible and allows for subjectivity.  
For managers, the first step in conducting a force-field analysis is to develop a list 
of all the forces promoting change and all those resisting change, then determine which  
positive and which negative forces are the most powerful.  The forces can be ranked in 
order of importance or by strength.  To facilitate the change, leaders try to remove, or at 
least minimize, some of the forces acting against the change in order to tip the balance so 
that the forces furthering the change outweigh those hindering the change. Understanding 
Lewin’s three steps of changing human behavior and combining force field methodology, 
a strategy can begin to develop. 
The current cultural environment in Utah has evolved over decades.  The current 
environment will restrain, undermine, and resist the changes necessary to create a 
collaborative information-sharing infrastructure so important to homeland security.  
Groupthink, parochialism, and distrust must be studied, strategized, and removed before 
the environment can improve.  The absence of a strategy has made the current homeland 
security efforts inefficient and wasteful.  There has not been much significant 
improvement in the flow of information so critical to homeland security.  Not having an 
effective strategy to deal with cultural issues that hamper the sharing of information may 
be leaving the citizens of Utah dangerously vulnerable.  Significant attention and effort 
must be focused on this in developing a strategy.  However, powerful leadership must be 
created before a strategy can be developed.  This may require a reorganization of the  
45 Sims, Ronald R.  “Managing Organizational Behavior.”  Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut.  
2002.  Page 348 
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current structure in Utah.  Currently, the leadership role has been placed with the 
Department of Public Safety because the federal dollars are appropriated through this 
office.  This is an effective way to deliver the dollars but not the most effective way to 
lead the entire effort.  The current cultural environment where successes have been 
minimal would indicate a restructuring of leadership is needed.  This change will build 
the collaboration necessary to all aspects of homeland security, in particular the 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
29
                                                
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
Three levels of leadership and responsibility must be created and implemented in 
an effort to address and solve the problems of groupthink, parochialism and lack of trust 
that have previously been identified.  Each level has certain specific responsibilities that 
will direct this effort. 
The pyramid on the following page illustrates the different levels of leadership in 
Utah.  Discussion of the illustration provides recommendations on leadership separation 
among the various levels of government in Utah.    
Restructuring the leadership of the homeland security environment must be a top 
priority of the Governor of Utah. The Governor would task the Utah Department of 
Public Safety to coordinate and develop a top level task force, modeling it after the 
Olympic command structure.  This effort will create opportunities to share ideas and 
develop educational strategies related to homeland security.  This has the potential to 
drive the collaborative environment that will foster consistency, develop interpersonal 
skills and create the willingness to support Utah’s homeland security effort.  The first 
level group will be led from the Lt. Governor's office.  It would also include legislative, 
police and fire, agriculture and health, private enterprise, and any other appropriate 
discipline deemed necessary by the Lt. Governor's office.  The leaders selected may 
participate at all levels if deemed necessary.  These levels are not only responsible for the 
vision of the program but are also responsible for the impartation of that vision to the first 
responders.  As Cohen detailed in Effective Behavior in Organizations, a high level 
steering committee or advisory group must be created when change is required in the 
goals of the organization to help overcome barriers or resistance.46
 
46 Cohen AR, Fink S, Gadon H, Willits R.  Effective Behavior in Organizations.  Fifth Edition.  Erwin, 















Figure 1.   Levels of Leadership 
 
Leadership will prove the key to this program.  Sheriff Ed Phillips of Millard 
County, Utah put it succinctly in his response to the survey, “Leadership, my man, is 
everything.”47  The top level will be led by the Governor and Lieutenant Governor’s 
Office.  This policy group should be seen as the creators of the vision and must drive the 
homeland security environment statewide.  Chief Rick Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department responded to the homeland security survey by stating, “There is a lot of 
evidence to suggest that political leadership has been left out of the process, yet they 
drive policy if/when the critical incident occurs.  They need to be educated on the 
mission, the strategy and plans to accomplish the mission, directing the stakeholders and 
advocates.”48 Using Chief Dinse’s statement, it would be logical to conclude that a 
critical disconnect between policy and operations occurs when political leadership is left 
out of the process.  This creates an environment of noncommitment and distrust as is 
prevalent in Utah today.  John Kotter, in his article, stated, “One of the beginning steps is 
to form a powerful guiding coalition when attempting to change or lead any effort.”49  
                                                 
47 Sheriff Edgar Phillips of Millard County, Utah.  Response to survey mailed to Utah Sheriffs and 
Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.  March, 2004 
48 Chief Charles “Rick” Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah.  Response to survey 
mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.  March, 
2004 
49 Kotter, John P.  Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail.  March-April, 1995.  Page 103 
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Kotter described this step as assembling a group with enough power to lead the change 
effort and encouraging the group to work together as a team. This concept should be 
adopted at levels one and two of the strategy in Utah.  Assembling leadership, starting at 
the Governor's office, would insure the group had enough power to lead the change.   
Collaborative leadership in the beginning will be critical.  Involving members 
early is the first priority of the strategy.  One of the mistakes clearly made in Utah with 
the MATRIX program was to not involve the policy makers and policy implementers 
early enough.  The major restraining factor from Utah leadership was not including them 
when deciding to share the state’s data bases.  A comment by a Utah Sheriff underscores 
the importance of successful collaboration.  He indicated that without inclusion of the 
users in a policy decision, buy-in will not occur.  Sheriff Aaron Kennard, sheriff of the 
most populous county in Utah, indicated that he has a hard time getting involved in 
something as sensitive as formal information sharing or homeland security efforts that 
require coordination, if he is not brought in early in the creation.50  This has not been the 
historical way of doing business in Utah.  The Utah Criminal Intelligence Center is an 
example of not involving the users early; thus, the infrastructure was created with no 
customers.   
Leadership must draft a plan, strategize specific problems and communicate that 
information early in the process.  The vision and strategy should be disseminated and 
continually reinforced at every opportunity.  Chief Rick Dinse, Salt Lake City Police 
Department, in his survey feedback, wrote, “There doesn't seem to be a plan, and if there 
is one, it is not being communicated.”51  
The analysis of the current environment also indicates that a communication gap 
exists between the layers of the organizations involved in the homeland security effort.  
Kotter recognized the importance of creating and communicating a vision.  He points out 
that it is just as important to communicate that vision as creating it.  The vision would be  
 
50 Sheriff Aaron Kennard’s comment to DPS Commissioner R. Flowers.  Executive Meeting.  January, 
2004 
51 Chief Charles “Rick” Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah.  Response to survey 
mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety.  March, 
2004 
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created at the top level then communicated through formal and informal strategies to each 
level.  It would be critical to use every resource possible to communicate the new vision 
and strategies.  
Leadership should also crystallize the vision at appropriate government levels 
with contracts.  The vision should become formalized with memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) or any other mechanism that solidifies the vision.  Chief Rick 
Dinse pointed out the need for MOUs.  He wrote, “The need to have understanding 
between cities and counties must be collaborative and formal. The effort must involve all 
city departments. This formality clarifies who will come and what they will bring when 
help is needed. The state should also be a player in these documents statewide.”52  
Powerful leadership can commit resources and drive fiscal policy.  Funding 
should be used to motivate the participants and to demonstrate the importance of this 
effort to the policy group.  The use of fiscal policy can be a powerful motivator to drive 
the strategy compliance.  A change in funding methods may be required to change the 
current priorities of the current effort.  This could be done at the highest policy level.   
Resources must be committed to training and education and follow-up exercising of 
response plans.  Currently in Utah this is being done by the creation of a homeland 
security curriculum that will be developed for all levels of government.  The curriculum 
is being developed by experts in several fields and with the guidance of higher education 
institutions.  By requiring first responders to participate in the education and training 
program, cultural issues such as groupthink, parochialism, and the lack of trust can be 
addressed statewide.  This would be a major achievement in building the collaboration so 
necessary to the homeland security environment. 
Leadership must manage the vision and build in accountability.  Leadership 
watches to see if the policies and directions are being implemented.  This should be done 
formally as well as informally.  This can be achieved through formal or informal 
meetings where progress is evaluated through submitted reports.  Leadership must listen 
to the feedback provided by the customers.  This creates trust and consistency important 
 
52 Chief Charles “Rick” Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah.  Response to survey 




                                                
to the process.  Police Chief Lynn Excell of the Hurricane Police Department stated, “It 
was great to be asked about our needs, and great to know we were being listened to.”53  
Listening should be done by holding quarterly meetings, private conversations, and any 
other available communication method.  Another example of the benefit that comes from 
listening to feedback is noted from the comments of Weber County Sheriff Brad Slater.  
In an open meeting he acknowledged the fact that the survey went out and sheriffs were 
finally asked their opinion.  Further, he reported it was important that the state “listens to 
the Sheriffs to get commitment.”54
Once the feedback is received, it is critical to make any appropriate adjustments.  
This empowers those making the recommendation and demonstrates collaboration.  
Listening and acting also can have a dramatic effort on building trust into the effort.  This 
creates a robust communication system and ensures buy-in by those requesting any 
changes.  For example, a recommended change to a log in process to a communication 
program was provided but not acted on.  This evolved into an adversary group forming 
(groupthink) and opting out of Utah’s ULEIN project.  The result was a major set back to 
the information process designed by the state.  The ULEIN example would have been 
avoided if the leadership of the ULEIN project would have listened to the users and acted 
upon their recommendations. 
The ULEIN example demonstrates the problem arising from not making 
recommended changes to policy or implementing changes.  P. Hersey, in his book 
Management of Organizational Behavior, Utilizing Human Resources, writes about the 
process of change and collaboration.  He explains that the method utilized to introduce 
change or to motivate change is critical to gaining support.  There are two methodologies; 
namely, participative change and directive change.  Hersey explains them in the 
following way.  Participative change is implemented when new knowledge is made 
available to the individual or group.  At this level an effective strategy must be to involve 
the group directly in helping or formalizing the new methods for obtaining the goal.  This 
is group participation.  Participative change is appropriate at the higher levels of 
 
53 Chief Lynn Excell of Hurricane Police Department, Utah.  Meeting with the Commissioner of the 
Utah Department of Public Safety during the EDI conference in St. George, Utah.  Monday, March 22, 
2004 
54 Sheriff Brad Slater of  Weber County Sheriffs Office, Utah.  Meeting with the Commissioner of the 
Utah Department of Public Safety during the EDI conference in St. George, Utah.  Friday, March 26, 2004 
government, or command, or in group participation.  The goal of participative change is 
to gain information, identify problems, find solutions, make adjustments, and finally gain 
buy-in.  This environment is more appropriate after the policy has been discussed and 
implemented.  This philosophy is directed more towards the first responder or field 
personnel, like operating procedures that direct behavior in organizations.55
Most people tend to prefer participative change.  However, effective change 
agents are identified as those who can adopt their strategies to the demands of the unique 
environment.  The best strategy depends on the environment, and, in the case of 
homeland security, the policy/implementation will have a different strategy, given the 
organizational structure.  For example, the high policy levels may require a more 
participative environment versus the first responder/law enforcement officer, where a 
more directive approach would be appropriate.  First responders may be better served to 
take a more directed approach, much like the current environment in organizations.  
According to Hersey, the participative style tends to be more effective when introduced 
by leaders who have personal power; that is, they have reference, information, and expert 
power.56  The directive style necessitates that a leader have significant positional power.  
This is an important issue when attempting to institute change among different levels and 
different jurisdictions in Utah.  The strategy must take into account these different levels 
and, thus, different approaches.  Each level has unique motivators and a one-style 
approach would be counterproductive.  Many examples exist in Utah where the directive 
approach has not worked.  These examples are provided for us in legislative actions, 
grant requirements, budget directives, and law.  As the Utah leaders develop the strategy 
in detail, that strategy must include collaboration with powerful leadership.  By not doing 
so, improvement of the current environment in Utah will not occur.  As the leadership 
develops the collaborative environment necessary, the next process to implement is the 
analysis of the restraining and driving forces that currently exist in Utah.  These are the 
cultural forces that will either drive or restrain the homeland security efforts.  The various 
34
                                                 
55 Hersey, P. and Blanchard, K.H.  “Management of Organizational Behavior. Utilizing Human 
Resources.”  Fifth Edition.  Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988.  Page 333 
56 Hersey, P. and Blanchard, K.H.  “Management of Organizational Behavior. Utilizing Human 
Resources.”  Fifth Edition.  Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988.  Page 335 
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leadership levels will discover common driving and restraining forces.  They will also 
discover different forces that will require unique strategies.  For example, the restraining 
forces of politics will be powerful at the top level but may be less of a factor among the 
first responders.  Further, the change environment may be less participative and more 
directive at the first responder level.  By not understanding these nuances, major 
obstacles to building this collaborative effort will develop. 
The restraining and driving forces at the top level have begun to be identified in 
meetings, group discussions, and private conversations.  The characteristics of trust, 
groupthink, and parochialism must be considered very strong based on the discussions 
surrounding these characteristics and should be of highest priority.  The restraining and 
driving forces have been identified and are diagrammed below.  Recommended strategies 
for each characteristic should be developed.  A few suggested problem solving strategies 
are recommended in this thesis. 
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Figure 3.    Level II Leadership 
 
Level two objectives must implement the policies created by Level one in order to 
develop methods and create infrastructure that will support the policies directed by Level 
one. 
The participants of level two would be selected by the Lt. Governor's office with 
the input of the level one participants.  The creation of a powerful robust leadership at 
this level is as important as the top levels.  This group would be much like the members 
of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command.  The Utah Olympic Public Safety 
Command was a board made up of different disciplines but with command experience 
and field expertise.   
This level could be created by Executive Order and given statutory authority.  For 
example, in 1998 the Utah Legislature created the statute that allows the Public Safety 
Command (UCA-53-12) to manage public safety and law enforcement planning and 
operations for the 2002 games.  The 20 statutory members of the command include 
representatives from federal, state and local law enforcement, EMS, fire, emergency 
management, public works, public health, and the Utah National Guard.  This board 
could do for homeland security in Utah what the Utah Public Safety Command did for 
the Olympics.  It is recommended that the Governor of Utah create this type of board for 
homeland security.  It would be the obligation of this level to promote the vision and in 
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some cases the strategy of level one.  The same strategies developed by level one should 
be mirrored at level two.  The strategies to build collaboration, communication, and trust 
should be of the highest priority at all levels.  Strategies to address parochialism, 
groupthink, and the lack of trust should be embedded in level two as in level one. 
It should be the first priority of level two to craft a plan and develop policy that 
supports the vision and goals set forth by level one.  Part of this priority is to commit 
resources, create training/education goals and objectives, and to develop accountability 
measures so important to this effort.  To get the much-needed input, a participative 
environment must be supported and maintained.  As in level one, an environment of 
openness, confidences kept, and agreements honored is mandatory. 
At this level there are several motivators for change.  When the policy makers and 
leaders are convinced that a more modern approach would benefit citizens’, and thus 
their, interest a major philosophy change may occur.  An example of a new way of 
thinking was the change from a traditional reactive approach by law enforcement, where 
systems developed into stovepipes, to a community policing approach, where stovepipes 
were replaced by networked problem solving.  This change of thought process will be 
required in leadership for homeland security to succeed.  This change environment was 
driven by top level leaders and reinforced by the second level. 
Leadership will be the key to influence organizations toward an effective 
homeland security environment that is interoperable and networked.  Strong leadership 
will be necessary for optimal effectiveness.  Just as author Stephen Robbins writes, “In 
today’s dynamic world, we need leaders to challenge the status-quo and to create a vision 
of the future.”57  The metamorphosis of community-oriented policies could be used as an 
example of the scope of change that will be required for homeland security in Utah.  The 
processes can be identified and strategized for.  
The restraining and driving forces may mirror many of the same forces that were 
experienced by the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. Those restraining and driving 
forces are outlined in the following diagram.  Those forces listed are not all-inclusive but 
would be a good starting point to build a strategy at level two.  Of course, it would be just 
as important for this group to develop its process to continually identify and strategize  
57 Robbins, Stephen P., “Essentials of Organizational Behavior.”  Third Edition.  Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.   
other restraining and driving forces.  These forces will change given the complexity of 
the human environment.  Identifying these forces must be done through formal and 
informal feedback, continual dialogue, surveys, and any other available means. 
The restraining and driving forces for the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command 
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Figure 4.   Restraining and Driving Forces of UOPSC 
Note:  These forces are based on the Chairman of the Public Safety Command.  
He based his opinions on experience and feedback from many of the members over time.  
These are only meant as a starting point for discussion for Levels 1 and 2. 
 
The third level is the individual organization level.  This level is made up of all 
the different public safety organizations spreading across jurisdictions, disciplines, and 
levels of government.  The leadership of this level is the agency chief executive.  The 
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federal leadership would be made up of those assigned to the geographic area of Utah.  
The strategy, starting with the top level, would be working through the second level to 
coordinate the homeland security strategy continuing to the third level. This type of 
collaboration is a new concept for Utah homeland security.  Historically, the Department 
of Public Safety drives public safety efforts that require a statewide focus.  The current 
environment in Utah is a result of that strategy.  What has occurred historically is that 
recommendations or procedures were created by the officials at the state level then 
communicated through a variety of ways by those officials.  The historical approaches 
created confusion and lack of support for the effort.  This led to a state information 
infrastructure that was largely ignored.  Another significant change would require 
agencies that do not generally work together to coordinate their homeland security 
efforts.  For example, health departments, agriculture departments, and other public 
safety agencies will be required to share information and procedures.  The collaboration 
of these many different disciplines will be driven by leadership.  The overall strategy, 
which includes resource allocation, will be driven by levels one and two and acted upon 
at level three, which is the level of the first responder.  The restraining and driving forces 
at level three will include those of level two.  The restraining and driving forces of level 
three are no different than those routinely experienced when any department or 
organization attempts to make significant change within the boundaries of that 
organization.  The responsibility of creating a strategy to deal with these forces will be 
left up to the chief executive of the particular organization.  However, an education and 
training curriculum will be available to those chief executives to introduce and implement 
the homeland security concepts within Utah. 
The strategy at the third level is focused on training and education.  A strong 
training and education program, if developed with the historical cultural forces in Utah in 
mind, can be effective in developing trust, commitment, and collaboration among the 
public safety organizations in the state.  Education and training are key to gaining the 
commitment, collaboration, and trust so important to this effort.  The first responders are 
key to prevention, response, and mitigation of all critical incidents.  It is the goal of this 
program to unfreeze the current thinking of first responders, motivate them to move in a 
desired direction, and institute new behaviors and a new way of thinking that is required 
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in the Utah homeland security environment. Without a highly trained and motivated first 
responder, the homeland security effort in Utah will not improve beyond the status quo.  
The current environment has proven less than sufficient to meet the new challenges of 
homeland security in Utah. 
At the organizational level, policies, guidelines and training will be critical.  The 
desired behavior of first responders needs to be guided by policy, driven by leadership, 
and motivated by training.  The Utah Department of Public Safety has been tasked with 
the responsibility of creating a training program.  This effort has already begun.  A 
curriculum is being developed and is currently being evaluated by subject matter experts 
before being introduced to the first responder community.  The Department of Public 
Safety has teamed up with Utah State University to develop and deliver this homeland 
security training and certification program.  It is the goal of those developing the training 
that not only will expertise be developed, but that the curriculum address those cultural 
issues imbedded into the first responders that have proven to be counterproductive.  The 
curriculum has been developed with that goal in mind. 
The training developed for first responders and the state of Utah has been 
separated into levels of training.  The training objective will not only enhance knowledge 
of the subject matter but also break down those cultural barriers that are embedded in the 
behavior of first responders.  The objectives of the first level of the program are to create 
awareness of the importance of homeland security, to create an understanding of the 
various elements involved, provide a review of the inter-relationships of elements, to 
clarify the role the public can play in homeland security, and to create a better 
understanding of how this knowledge can contribute to the security and well-being of the 
nation.  Emphasizing that awareness will result in empowerment of the general public so 
that they will be able to feel the need and responsibility for protection of their neighbors 
and community.  This level is focused on the general public. 
This level may be the most difficult, not only for leadership to build a strategy, 
but to build collaboration, communication systems, and trust, simply because of the sheer 
number of organizations.  In Utah there are 29 counties with numerous police 
departments, fire departments, health and agriculture organizations.  The strategy is to 
start the leadership of this effort in the Governor's office, being inclusive of many 
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different levels of governmental agencies and the private sector.  In this way, we will 
gain support and credibility to motivate leadership at all levels to buy-in to the homeland 
security effort. 
As with the previous two levels there are restraining and driving forces that come 
into play in creating an effective homeland security environment.  Change of any kind is 
extremely difficult.  Groupthink and parochialism live and thrive at this level. An 
example of the difficulty initiating cultural change in public safety organizations is a 
recent change in philosophy over the last ten years from a reactive philosophy of law-
enforcement agencies to that of community policing.  This philosophical change was 
brought about by many factors.  Those factors include leadership, political pressure, 
education and training.  Probably the most critical factor is the buy-in of the first 
responder.  The processes of this philosophical change could be examined as an example 
of the changes that may be required for an effective homeland security environment. 
As in community policing methodologies, an effective homeland security 
environment will require processes to change those cultural characteristics that now 
hamper the effort.  For levels one and two, a primary focus is on leadership.  The strategy 
is to influence leadership to support a collaborative, effective, trusted homeland security 
environment where prevention, response, and mitigation of events can take place.  The 
critical aspect of this homeland security environment is that of an information gathering, 
sharing, and analyzing infrastructure necessary to create effective plans, guidelines and 
policies at the first responder level. 
At the department or organizational level, what become critical are policies, 
guidelines, and training to affect the behavior of the first responders.  The desired 
behavior of first responders needs to be motivated by policy, directed by leadership, and 
guided by training.  The Utah Department of Public Safety should be tasked with the 
responsibility of creating a training program to provide the necessary training to first 
responders.  This effort has begun in DPS.  A curriculum has been developed and is 
currently being evaluated by subject matter experts before being introduced to the first 
responder community.  The Department of Public Safety has teamed up with Utah State 
University to develop and deliver this homeland security training and certification 
program. 
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The third level will be directed at specialty certifications.  Upon completing a 
specialty certification, the participant will be able to perform the specialty function to an 
exceptional level by demonstrating the knowledge and proficiency in a relevant exercise.  
The certified individual will also perform the specialty function at the local level in 
concert with others in the area who have expertise in different functions, thus creating a 
team of educated and trained professionals who can serve their communities in the event 
of an emergency or disaster.  These individuals must have a working knowledge of other 
functions, their interrelationships, and how the teams can function at an enhanced level of 
performance.  They will have the knowledge and networks necessary to recognize the 
need for expanding the support level beyond their own community, should that be 
necessary.  They will also need a working knowledge of the incident management system 
and the emergency operations Center and of how these integrate. 
The target audience will be individuals from a variety of disciplines, at both 
command and operational levels.  They will include law enforcement, fire fighting, 
emergency services, health professionals, private entities, and other professionals who 
may be identified in the future. The subject matter of this certification will include: 
1. intelligence, information sharing 
2. investigation management 
3. emergency planning 
4. infrastructure analysis 
5. health and medical subject matter  
6. agriculture  
7. risk analysis 
The goal of creating subject matter certification is to build credibility into the 
training and education programs.  This will also create a cadre of trained and certified 
professionals in the state of Utah. 
The programs will include a necessary ongoing research component.  This 
research component is essential to homeland security in Utah to ensure the right goals are 
in place.  The objectives are to: 
1. engage the scientific and technical community in Utah in this effort 
2. evaluate and investigate previously studied design and results 
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3. create collaborative relationships with higher education 
4. provide most current information relative to homeland security in Utah 
5. provide the cutting edge technology, policies and procedures to policy makers 
at all levels of government and the private sector. 
 
One of the main goals at all levels of this training and education effort must be the 
changing of the existing culture in Utah. This change will be as dramatic as what 
occurred among first responders when police agencies adopted the Community Policing 
Philosophy.  This was a dramatic change in culture from a reactionary mindset to a 
collaborative problem solving method.  This dramatic change required leadership, robust 
strategies and strong education and training programs. The new thinking required in the 
evolving homeland security environment for first responders must be developed by 
education programs supported by leadership.  Without education and training the changes 

















Culture in Utah has become an impediment to creating a collaborative 
environment among public safety agencies necessary for homeland security.  The current 
culture has evolved for many reasons and has a long history.  The culture is one of 
groupthink, parochialism, and little trust among public safety organizations.  These 
characteristics have had a negative effect among public safety organizations in Utah, and 
if not strategize for will jeopardize the flow of information necessary to homeland 
security.  Information is the lifeblood of prevention, detection, and mitigation planning. 
Trust is the one factor mentioned most often by public safety officials in Utah.  
Trust reflects the willingness to commit to concepts based on a history of collaboration, 
communication, positive experiences, and consistency.  These four aspects of trust must 
be re-enforced through a strategy that develops these important characteristics.  The lack 
of these four critical elements among agencies in Utah has created an environment where 
homeland security efforts cannot move forward with the necessary urgency and 
commitment. 
The current spending of dollars to buy equipment for first responders is important 
but may prove ineffective and wasteful without a strategy to address the cultural aspects 
of homeland security.  Terms such as collaboration, communication, and interoperability 
all have a critical component; that component is the human aspect.  This aspect has been 
ignored in Utah, and the current culture is a result of that.  There is little history in Utah 
of long-term collaboration, trusted communication or consideration of interoperability for 
future needs.  Generally, leadership communication among public safety organizations is 
reduced to meetings, collaboration is on a case-by-case basis, and there is little 
understanding/agreement of interoperability.  Yet, these important human aspects are 
discussed everywhere in homeland security at all levels of government. 
The one critical aspect of homeland security in Utah being ignored is human 
aspect.  Leadership is haphazard, groupthink has thrived, parochialism has evolved, and 
the lack of trust among the disciplines and organizations is the order of the day.  We must 
rebuild the culture in Utah where trust is widespread, collaboration is routine, and 
communication is robust.  This is a departure from the way business has been done in 
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Utah.   The rebuilding will start with creation of powerful leadership.  This leadership 
must develop a collaborative strategy addressing the cultural issues proving to be 
impediments to the necessary homeland security environment.  An education and training 
program must be developed and delivered to the first responders, both public and private.  
Absent powerful leadership, a robust human strategy, and an education program the 
current environment will only continue.  This cannot be allowed to happen in Utah, given 
the need to win the war against terrorism.   
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